Linear broadcast encryption schemes  by Padró, Carles et al.
Discrete Applied Mathematics 128 (2003) 223–238
www.elsevier.com/locate/dam
Linear broadcast encryption schemes
Carles Padr#o∗ , Ignacio Gracia, Sebasti)a Mart#*n, Paz Morillo
Departament de Matematica Aplicada IV, Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, C. Jordi Girona 1–3,
Campus Nord, Edi#ci C3, 08034 Barcelona, Spain
Received 27 February 2001; received in revised form 14 February 2002; accepted 8 April 2002
Abstract
A new family of broadcast encryption schemes, which will be called linear broadcast en-
cryption schemes (LBESs), is presented in this paper by using linear algebraic techniques. This
family generalizes most previous proposals and provides a general framework to the study of
broadcast encryption schemes. We present a method to construct, for a general speci:cation
structure, LBESs with a good trade-o; between the amount of secret information stored by ev-
ery user and the length of the broadcast message. In this way, we are able to :nd schemes that
:t in situations that have not been considered before.
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1. Introduction
This paper deals with key distribution methods that are suitable for situations in
which some groups of users in a network need to securely and privately communi-
cate between them. This communication can be done e>ciently by using a symmetric
encryption algorithm. The main problem is that symmetric algorithms require that the
users in the group establish a common key before starting the communication. Usually,
an on-line key distribution center is used, which provides a common key to every user
in a group just before these users need to communicate between them. Other solutions
are based on the use of an o/-line key distribution center, which distributes some
secret information among all users in the network. Every user will use the information
it received to compute the common keys associated with the groups it belongs to. See
[25] for an overview on key distribution systems.
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We consider here key distribution systems that can be used by an o;-line key dis-
tribution center. More concretely, broadcast encryption schemes (BESs) are the main
subject of this paper. Key predistribution schemes (KPSs), which are very useful in
the construction of BESs, are also considered in this work.
A KPS, which is called a zero-message broadcast encryption scheme in [5,11], is a
method by which a trusted authority (TA) distributes secret information among a set
of users in such a way that every user is able to compute the keys corresponding to the
privileged groups it belongs to. Besides, certain coalitions of users (forbidden subsets)
outside a privileged group must not be able to :nd any information on the value of
the key associated with that group. A BES consists of two phases. In the :rst one, in
a similar way as in a KPS, some secret information is sent by the TA to every user. In
the second phase, the TA broadcasts through an open channel an encrypted message in
such a way that every user in some privileged subset is able to decrypt it. This message
will be used by the users in this group as a common key for secure communication.
The users in a forbidden subset cannot obtain any information on the message that
has been sent by the TA. Broadcasting some public information in a BES makes it
possible, in general, to reduce the amount of secret information that every user receives
in the predistribution phase. We are interested here in unconditionally secure schemes,
that is, schemes whose security does not depend on any computational assumption. The
BESs we consider in this paper are called one-time BESs in [16,26] because just one
single broadcast can be securely made by such schemes. This is due to the fact that
the broadcast message can provide to a user in a privileged subset some information
about the secret information of the other users in this subset.
KPSs were introduced by Blom [4] and have been also considered in [5–7,10–12,14–
17,19–24,26,27]. The :rst BESs were proposed by Berkovits [3] and Fiat and Naor
[11]. Afterwards, several authors have studied these schemes [1,2,5,8,9,13,16,18,26–28].
A good survey on these subjects can be found in [26].
The speci#cation structure  of a KPS or a BES is the family of all pairs (P; F)
of subsets of the set of users U such that every user in P must be able to compute a
common key to P that will remain unknown to the coalition F . A -KPS and a -BES
are, respectively, a key predistribution scheme and a broadcast encryption scheme with
speci:cation structure . The speci:cation structures that have been considered in most
previous works about key predistribution and broadcast encryption are in the form
=(P;F)={(P; F)∈P×F: P∩F=∅}, where P;F ⊂ 2U. Threshold speci#cation
structures, that is, the speci:cation structures in which P and F consist of the subsets
of U with some given number of users have received considerable attention. If P
consists of all subsets of U with cardinality r and F is formed by the coalitions
of at most t users, a (P;F)-KPS (BES) is called also a (r;6 t)-KPS (BES). In a
(6 r;6 t)-KPS (BES), the family of privileged subsets consists of all subsets of U
with cardinality at most r.
The information rate and the broadcast information rate are the main parameters to
measure the e>ciency of a BES. The information rate of a BES (or a KPS) is the
ratio between the length in bits of the secret message (or the common key) and the
maximum length of the secret information received by the users. In a BES, one has
to consider also the length of the encrypted message that has to be broadcasted by the
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TA. The ratio between the length of the secret message and the broadcast message is
the broadcast information rate.
In a BES, the information rate and the broadcast information rate cannot be optimized
at the same time. In general, the information rate must decrease in order to increase
the broadcast information rate.
An easy way to obtain a BES is to distribute a random value ui ∈G, where G is
an Abelian group, to every user i∈U. In order to send a secret message mP ∈G to
the users in a privileged subset P, the TA broadcasts the message bP = (bi)i∈P , where
bi = mp + ui. In this case, the information rate is maximum, = 1, but the broadcast
information rate can be very small, B = 1=(maxP∈P() |P|).
On the other hand, a -BES with maximum broadcast information rate B = 1 can
be constructed from any -KPS such that, for every privileged subset P, the common
key kP is an element of an Abelian group G. In that case, the broadcast message is
bP = mP + kP , where kP is the common key that can be computed by the users in P
in the -KPS. The information rate of this -BES coincides with the information rate
of the -KPS.
One of the problems that have been most considered in previous works about broad-
cast encryption is obtaining a good trade-o; between the information rate and the
broadcast information rate. That is, given a speci:cation structure , one is interested
in :nding a family of -BESs between the two extremal cases above with an optimal
relation between their information rate and broadcast information rate. In other words, a
family of -BESs whose information rates verify ∗¡¡ 1 and 1=r ¡B¡ 1, where
∗ is the best information rate for a -KPS and r=maxP∈P() |P|, in such a way that
it is not possible to simultaneously improve both information rates in any of these
schemes.
Several bounds have been given for the information rate of a KPS [5,7,16]. The opti-
mality of the (6 r;6 t)-KPSs proposed in [6,11] is derived from these bounds. Blundo
et al. present in [8] a family of (r;6 t)-BESs obtaining a trade-o; between the infor-
mation rate and the broadcast information rate. These BESs are constructed by using
the optimal threshold KPSs given in [6]. Nevertheless, no general bounds have been
found about the relation between the information rate and the broadcast information
rate of a BES in order to prove or disprove the optimality of the BESs in [8].
The authors present in [22] a new approach to the design of KPSs, the linear key
predistribution schemes (LKPSs). This model, which is based on linear algebraic tech-
niques, uni:es all previous proposals and provides a common mathematical formulation
and a better understanding of KPSs. Besides, we present in [22] some methods to con-
struct LKPSs that :t in situations that had not been considered before. For instance,
speci:cation structures in which di;erent families of forbidden subsets correspond to
di;erent privileged subsets are considered.
In this paper, we apply the ideas in [22] to the design of BESs. We present the
family of linear broadcast encryption schemes (LBESs), which includes, as far as we
know, all previously proposed BESs. Analogous to the case of key predistribution, this
new model provides a general framework to future works on broadcast encryption.
By using this approach, we present a method to construct families of LBESs, for
speci:cation structures that are not threshold, in order to obtain a trade-o; between the
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information rate and the broadcast information rate. Concretely, given a speci:cation
structure , we consider several coverings of the privileged subsets. For each one of
these coverings B, a speci:cation structure B is de:ned and a -LBES is constructed
from any B-LKPS.
The main concepts about KPSs and BESs as well as the notation that will be used are
presented in Section 2. We recall the de:nition and some facts about LKPSs in Section
3. LBESs are introduced in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to present a method to
construct LBESs from LKPSs. By using this method, we obtain LBESs for speci:cation
structures di;erent from the threshold ones.
2. Preliminaries
A speci#cation structure  on a set of users U is a subset of {(P; F)∈ 2U×2U: P∩
F = ∅}. A subset P ⊂ U is a privileged subset of the speci:cation structure  if there
exists F ⊂ U such that (P; F)∈. The family of the privileged subsets of  will be
denoted by P(). For any P ∈P(), let us consider FP = {F ⊂ U: (P; F)∈}.
The elements of FP will be called the P-forbidden subsets of . We are going
to consider only speci:cation structures such that, for any P ∈P(), the family of
P-forbidden subsets FP is monotone decreasing, that is, if F1 ∈FP and F2 ⊂ F1, then
F2 ∈FP .
In a BES with speci:cation structure , or -BES for short, every user i∈U receives
also from the TA some secret information ui ∈Ui. Afterwards, for any privileged sub-
set P ∈P() and for any possible value of a secret message mP ∈M, the TA sends
by the broadcast channel some information bP ∈BP such that every user i∈P can
compute the message mP from its secret information ui and the broadcast informa-
tion bP . On the other hand, any coalition F = {j1; : : : ; js} such that (P; F)∈ must
not obtain any information about mP from the secret information (uj1 ; : : : ; ujs) received
by the users in F and the public information bP . That is, if we use Pr to denote a
probability,
Pr(MP = mP |Uj1 = uj1 ; : : : ; Ujs = ujs ; BP = bP) = Pr(MP = mP);
where MP , Uj‘ and BP are, respectively, the random variables corresponding to the
secret message mP , the secret information uj‘ and the broadcast message bP .
A more formal de:nition of BESs can be given by using the entropy function. See
[29] for an introduction to entropy and its properties. For any subset A={i1; : : : ; is} ⊂ U,
let us consider UA=Ui1×· · ·×Uis . We can suppose that the TA chooses a value in UU,
according to some probability distribution, in order to distribute the secret information
among the users and, afterwards, a value in BP in order to do the broadcast. A -BES
must satisfy the following conditions:
(1) The secret message mP must be independent of the secret values distributed in the
predistribution phase, that is,
H (MP |UU) = H (MP):
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(2) Any participant i∈P in a quali:ed subset P ∈P() is able to compute the common
key mP from its secret information ui and the broadcast message bp:
H (MP |UiBP) = 0:
(3) The participants in a P-forbidden subset F ∈FP cannot obtain any information on
mP , that is,
H (MP |UFBP) = H (MP):
Let OUU ⊂ UU denote the set of all possible combinations (ui)16i6N of secret values
received by the users in U. In this paper, we are going to consider only BESs with
uniform probability distributions on M, Ui, OUU and BP .
In that case, the third condition of the de:nition of a BES means that, regarding to
the secret information (uj)j∈F of the users in any coalition F ∈FP , and the broadcast
message bP , all values of the secret mP ∈M are equiprobable.
The information rate  of a BES is the ratio between the length of the secret
message mP and the maximum length of the secret information received by a user,
that is,
=
log |M|
maxi∈U log |Ui| :
The broadcast information rate B of a BES is de:ned as the ratio between the length
of the secret message mP and the maximum length of the broadcast message bP:
B =
log |M|
maxP∈P() log |BP| :
Let  be a speci:cation structure on a set of users U = {1; 2; : : : ; N}. In a KPS with
speci:cation structure , or -KPS for short, a TA gives to every user i∈U some
secret information ui from a certain set Ui. For any P ∈P(), this information must
enable every user i∈P to compute a secret key kP ∈K, associated with the set P,
where K is, for any P ∈P(), the set of all possible values of kP . For any coalition
F={j1; : : : ; js} such that (P; F)∈, the users in F do not obtain any information about
kP from their secret information (uj1 ; : : : ; ujs). That is,
Pr(KP = kP |Uj1 = uj1 ; : : : ; Ujs = ujs) = Pr(KP = kP);
where KP and Uj are, respectively, the random variables corresponding to the common
key kP and the secret information uj corresponding to a user j∈F . KPSs are called
zero-message BESs in [5,11].
KPSs can be de:ned also in terms of the entropy function. We skip this de:nition
because it is analogous to the one applied to BESs. In the same way as we do for
BESs, we are going to consider only KPSs with uniform probability distributions onK,
Ui, and OUU, where, as before, OUU ⊂ UU denotes the set of all possible combinations
(ui)16i6N of secret values received by the users in U. The information rate  of a
KPS is the ratio between the length of the secret keys kP and the maximum length of
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the secret information received by a user, that is,
=
log |K|
maxi∈U log |Ui| :
We can consider also the total information rate T of a KPS by comparing the length
of the secret keys kP with the total amount of secret information received by all users:
T =
log |K|
log | OUU|
:
The total information rate is the reciprocal of the randomness coe:cient, as de:ned
in [7].
Next lemmas are a key point in the de:nition of LKPSs and LBESs.
Lemma 1. Let E and E0 be vector spaces over a #nite #eld Fq and let V ⊂ E be a
vector subspace. Let ’0 :E → E0 be a surjective linear mapping. Then, ’0(V ) = E0
if and only if V + ker ’0 = E.
Proof. Let us suppose that ’0(V )=E0. Then, for any x∈E, there exists y∈V such that
’0(x)=’0(y). Therefore, x=y+(x−y), where y∈V and x−y∈ ker ’0. Reciprocally,
if V + ker ’0 = E, then E0 = ’0(E) = ’0(V + ker ’0) = ’0(V ).
Lemma 2. Let E, E0 and E1 be vector spaces over a #nite #eld Fq. Let us consider
two linear mappings, ’0 :E → E0 and ’1 :E → E1, where ’0 is surjective. Let us
suppose that a vector x∈E is chosen uniformly at random. Then,
(1) the value of x0 =’0(x) can be uniquely determined from x1 =’1(x) if and only
if ker ’1 ⊂ ker ’0,
(2) the value of x1 provides no information about the value of x0 if and only if
ker ’1 + ker ’0 = E.
Proof. Let us suppose that we know the value of x1 =’1(x), but we do not know the
value of x, and we want to guess the value of x0 = ’0(x). Then, we know that
x∈’−11 (x1) = {y∈E: ’1(y) = x1}:
That is,
x∈y0 + ker ’1 = {y0 + z ∈E: z ∈ ker ’1};
where y0 ∈E is any vector with ’1(y0) = x1. Of course, we are able to :nd such
a vector and to determine ker ’1, that is, we know which is the set ’−11 (x1). Since
x0 = ’0(x) and we know that x∈’−11 (x1), we have that
x0 ∈’0(y0) + ’0(ker ’1) = {’0(y0) + ’0(z)∈E0: z ∈ ker ’1}:
Besides, all values in ’0(y0) + ’0(ker ’1) are equiprobable.
Then, x0 can be uniquely determined from x1 if and only if ’0(y0)+’0(ker ’1) has
exactly one element, that is, if and only if ’0(ker ’1) = {0}, and, hence, if and only
if ker ’1 ⊂ ker ’0.
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The value of x1 does not provide any information on the value of x0 if and only
if ’0(y0) + ’0(ker ’1) = E0, that is, if and only if ’0(ker ’1) = E0. In this case, x0
can be any vector in E0 with the same probability. In any other case, the value of
x1 provides partial information about the value of x0, namely, we will know that x0
cannot be any vector in E0\(’0(y0) + ’0(ker ’1)) = ∅. Finally, by Lemma 1, we have
that ’0(ker ’1) = E0 if and only if ker ’1 + ker ’0 = E.
3. Linear key predistribution schemes
We recall in this section the de:nition of LKPSs, which were introduced by the
authors in [22].
The de:nition of LKPSs follows from the next theorem
Theorem 3 (Padr#o et al. [22]). Let  be a speci#cation structure on the set of users
U= {1; 2; : : : ; N}. Let E and Ei = {0}, where i = 0; 1; : : : ; N , be vector spaces over a
#nite #eld Fq. Let us suppose that there exist a surjective linear mapping $i :E → Ei
for every user i∈U and a surjective linear mapping $P :E → E0 for every privileged
subset P ∈P() satisfying:
(1) ker $i ⊂ ker $P for any i∈P,
(2)
⋂
j∈F ker $j + ker $P = E for any F ∈FP .
Then, there exists a -KPS with information rate and total information rate
=
dim E0
maxi∈U dim Ei
and T =
dim E0
dim E
:
Proof. We are going to describe a -KPS with set of keys K= E0. We suppose that
the vector spaces E, E0, E1; : : : ; EN , as well as the mappings $i and $P are publicly
known. In the initialization phase, the TA randomly chooses a vector x∈E and sends
privately the vector ui = $i(x)∈Ei to every user i∈U.
Let P ∈P() be a privileged subset. The key associated with P will be kP =
$P(x)∈E0. By considering ’0=$P and ’1=$i in Lemma 2, every user i∈P can com-
pute the key kP . On the other hand, in order to prove that any coalition F ∈FP cannot
obtain any information about the key kP , we consider the linear mappings ’0 =$P and
’1 :E →
∏
j∈F Ej de:ned by ’1(x) = ($j(x))j∈F . Observe that ’1(x) corresponds to
the secret information known by the users in F . Since ker ’1 =
⋂
j∈F ker $j, we have
that ker ’0 + ker ’1 = E and, applying Lemma 2, we conclude that the users in F
cannot obtain any information on kP = ’0(x).
Denition 4. A key predistribution scheme with speci:cation structure  that can be
de:ned as in the proof of Theorem 3 will be called a -linear key predistribution
scheme (-LKPS).
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We proved in [22] that the best known KPSs, that is, the trivial scheme [26], the
Fiat–Naor scheme [11] and the KPS proposed by Blundo et al. [6], are linear.
4. Linear broadcast encryption schemes
We present in this section the de:nition of LBESs and some basic examples.
Theorem 5. Let  be a speci#cation structure on a set of users U={1; 2; : : : ; N}. Let
E, V0, and Ei, for any i∈U be non-trivial vector spaces over a #nite #eld Fq. Let us
suppose that there exist a surjective linear mapping $i :E → Ei for every user i∈U.
Let us suppose that, for any P ∈P(), there exist vector spaces EP and VP over Fq
and surjective linear mappings (P :EP → E, )P :EP → VP and *P :EP → V0 such
that
(1) ker(P + ker*P = EP ,
(2) ker($i ◦ (P) ∩ ker)P ⊂ ker*P for any i∈P,
(3) if F ∈FP , then
(⋂
j∈F ker($j ◦ (P) ∩ ker)P
)
+ ker*P = EP .
Then, there exists a -BES with information rate and broadcast information rate
=
dim V0
maxi∈U dim Ei
and B =
dim V0
maxP∈P() dim VP
;
respectively.
Proof. First, we are going to prove that, for any x∈E and for any mP ∈V0, there exists
a vector y∈EP such that (P(y)=x and *P(y)=mP . Let y′ ∈EP be a vector such that
(P(y′)=x. Since ker(P+ker*P=EP , by Lemma 1, we have that *P(y′+ker(P)=V0.
Then, there exists a vector y′′ ∈ ker(P such that *P(y′+y′′)=mP and (P(y′+y′′)=x.
We describe next a -BES with the required information rates. In the predistribution
phase, the TA chooses at random a vector x∈E and distributes privately to every
participant i∈U the secret information ui = $i(x)∈Ei. At a latter moment, if it is
necessary to send a secret message mP ∈V0 to a privileged subset P, the TA chooses
at random a vector y∈EP such that (P(y) = x and *P(y) = mP and broadcasts the
message bP =)P(y)∈VP .
The secret information received by the users in the predistribution phase is deter-
mined by the value of x = (P(y)∈E. Since ker(P + ker*P = EP , the value of the
secret message, mP = *P(y), is independent from the secret information distributed
among the users.
Let i∈P be a user in a privileged subset P ∈P(). Let us consider the linear
mappings ’0 :EP → V0 and ’1 :EP → Ei × VP de:ned by ’0 =*P and ’1(y) = (($i ◦
(P)(y); )P(y)). Observe that ’1(y) consists of the secret information received in the
predistribution phase by user i and the broadcast message. Since ker ’1=ker ($i◦(P)∩
ker)P , we can apply Lemma 2 in order to prove that user i can compute the secret
message mP from its secret information and the broadcast message.
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On the other hand, if F = {j1; : : : js}∈FP , we consider
’1 :EP → Ej1 × · · · × Ejs × VP;
de:ned by ’1(y)=(($j1 ◦(P)(y); : : : ; ($js ◦(P)(y); )P(y)). Observe that ’1(y) consists
of the secret information received by the users in F and the broadcast message. If, as
before, we consider ’0 =*P , taking into account that
ker ’1 + ker ’0 =

⋂
j∈F
ker ($j ◦ (P) ∩ ker)P

+ ker*P = EP;
we can apply Lemma 2 in order to prove that the users in F do not obtain any
information on the secret message mP from their secret information and the broadcast
message.
Denition 6. A broadcast encryption scheme with speci:cation structure  that can be
de:ned as in the proof of Theorem 5 will be called a -linear broadcast encryption
scheme (-LBES).
We show next two basic examples of LBESs, that correspond to the extremal cases
that were considered in Section 2.
Example 7. Let  be a speci:cation structure on a set of users U= {1; 2; : : : ; N}. We
present :rst a -LBES with maximum information rate =1 and broadcast information
rate B = 1=r, where r =maxP∈P() |P|. Let us consider the vector spaces E = FNq and
V0 = Fq, and, for any i = 1; : : : ; N , the surjective linear mapping $i :E → Fq de:ned
by $i(u1; : : : ; uN ) = ui. For any privileged subset P ∈P(), we consider EP = E × Fq,
VP = Frq, where r = |P|, and the mappings
• (P :EP → E, de:ned by (P(u; y) = u,
• )P :EP → VP , de:ned by )P((u1; : : : ; uN ); y) = (ui + y)i∈P ,
• *P :EP → V0, de:ned by *P(u; y) = y.
It is easy to check that these linear mappings satisfy conditions 1 and 2 in Theorem 5.
Let us prove that the third condition is also satis:ed. Let us consider a pair (P; F)∈
and a vector (u; y)∈EP . Let (v; y)=((v1; : : : ; vN ); y)∈EP be such that vi=−y if i∈P
and vj=0 if j∈F . Then (u; y)= (v; y)+ (u− v; 0), where (v; y)∈
⋂
j∈F ker($j ◦(P)∩
ker)P and (u − v; 0)∈ ker*P . Therefore, by Theorem 5, we obtain a -LBES with
the required information rates.
Example 8. This example consists in an easy method to obtain a -LBES with maxi-
mum broadcast information rate B = 1 from any -LKPSs. Let E, E1; : : : ; EN , E0 be
vector spaces over a :nite :eld Fq. Let us consider surjective linear mappings $i :E →
Ei, where i = 1; : : : N , and $P :E → E0, where P ∈P(), that de:ne a -LKPS. Let
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us take V0 = E0 and, for any P ∈P(), we consider EP = E × E0, VP = E0 and the
mappings
• (P :EP → E, de:ned by (P(x; y) = x,
• )P :EP → VP , de:ned by )P(x; y) = $P(x) + y,
• *P :EP → V0, de:ned by *P(x; y) = y.
It is obvious that these linear mappings verify the :rst condition in Theorem 5. In
order to prove that condition 2 is also satis:ed take into account that, by the de:nition
of a -LKPS, ker $i ⊂ ker $P if i∈P is a user in the privileged subset P ∈P(). If
(P; F)∈ and (x; y)∈EP , we consider x′ ∈E such that $P(x′)=−y. By the de:nition
of the -LKPS, we have that x′=x′1+x
′
2 with x
′
1 ∈
⋂
j∈F ker $j and x
′
2 ∈ ker $P . Finally,
observe that
(x; y) = (x′1;−$P(x′1)) + (x − x′1; 0)∈

⋂
j∈F
ker($j ◦ (P) ∩ ker)P

+ ker*P;
which implies that the third condition in Theorem 5 is also satis:ed.
5. Constructing LBES from LKPS
In this section, we are going to present a method to construct a family of -LBESs
for any speci:cation structure , in order to obtain a trade-o; between the information
rate and broadcast information rate. This is achieved by considering, associated to ,
a family of speci:cation structures, which is given in De:nition 9. Next, in Theorem
11, we present a method to construct a -LBES from any B-LKPS, where B is any
structure in the considered family.
Denition 9. Let  be a speci:cation structure on U={1; 2; : : : ; N}. Let us consider, for
every P ∈P(), a family of subsets BP ⊂ 2U such that
⋃
Q∈BP Q=P and Q ⊂ Q′ for
any pair of di;erent subsets Q;Q′ ∈BP . Let us take B= {BP: P ∈P()}. We de:ne
B as the speci:cation structure on U that is formed by the pairs (Q; F1)∈ 2U × 2U
such that Q∈BP and F1 = F ∪ (P \Q) for some (P; F)∈. Observe that we obtain a
di;erent speci:cation structure B for every choice of B.
The family of -LBESs we introduce in this section is obtained by considering the
family of speci:cation structures de:ned above. Namely, we present in Theorem 11 a
method to construct a -LBES from any given B-LKPS. Some properties that will
be used in the proof of that theorem are given in the next lemma.
Lemma 10. Let  be speci#cation structures on U and let B be a speci#cation
structure in the above family. Let us consider surjective linear mappings $i :E → Ei,
where i∈{1; : : : ; N}, and $Q :E → Fq, where Q∈P(B), de#ning a B-LKPS. Let
P ∈P() be a privileged subset of  and let us suppose that BP={Q1; : : : ; QM}. Let
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us consider the linear mapping -P :E → FMq de#ned by -P(x)= ($Q1 (x); : : : ; $QM (x)).
Then,
(1) -P is surjective and
(2) ker-P +
⋂
j∈F ker $j = E if (P; F)∈.
Proof. Let us suppose that -P is not surjective. Then, there exists a subspace G ⊂
FMq , with dimG = M − 1, such that -P(E) ⊂ G. The subspace G will be de:ned
by an equation in the form
∑M
k=1 .kxk = 0, where .k ∈Fq. We can assume without
loss of generality that .M = 0. Therefore,
∑M
k=1 .k$Qk (x) = 0 for any x∈E. Let
us suppose that every user i∈U has received the secret information $i(x), where
x∈E, corresponding to the B-LKPS we are considering. If the users in P \ QM
join together, they can compute $Q1 (x); : : : ; $QM−1 (x) from their secret information,
and, hence, they can obtain the value of $QM (x). That is a contradiction because
(QM ; P \ QM )∈B.
Let us suppose now that ker-P +
⋂
j∈F ker $j = E for some (P; F)∈. Then,
by taking ’0 = -P in Lemma 1, -P(
⋂
j∈F ker $j) = FMq . Therefore, there exists
a subspace G ⊂ FMq , with dimG = M − 1, such that -P(
⋂
j∈F ker $j) ⊂ G. Let
us consider the equation
∑M
k=1 .kxk = 0 that de:ne the subspace G, where .k ∈Fq.
We can assume without loss of generality that .M = 0. Let us consider the linear
mappings ’0 :E → Fq and ’1 :E →
∏
j∈F Ej de:ned by ’0(x) =
∑M
k=1 .k$Qk (x)
and ’1(x) = ($j(x))j∈F . Observe that ker ’1 =
⋂
j∈F ker $j ⊂ ker ’0. Let us sup-
pose that the vector x∈E has been used by the TA in order to distribute among
the users the secret information corresponding to the B-LKPS. By Lemma 2, if
the users in F put together their secret information, they will be able to compute∑M
k=1 .k$Qk (x). Therefore, the coalition F ∪ (P \ QM ) can :nd some information
about the value of the common key $QM (x) corresponding to the set QM , a contra-
diction.
Last lemma implies that there is no relation between the common keys $Q1 (x); : : : ;
$QM (x) corresponding to the privileged subsets Q1; : : : ; QM in the B-LKPS because
the vector ($Q1 (x); : : : ; $QM (x)) can take any value in F
M
q . Besides, a coalition of users
F such that (P; F)∈ cannot obtain any information about the value of this vector,
that is, they are not able to obtain any information about these keys nor any relation
between them. Both facts will be used in the proof of the next theorem, which provides
a construction of a -LBES from a B-LKPS.
Theorem 11. Let  be a speci#cation structure on U = {1; : : : ; N} and let B be
a speci#cation structure in the form described in De#nition 9. For every P ∈P(),
we consider MP = |BP| and /P = mini∈P |{Q∈BP: i∈Q}|. Let us consider M =
maxP∈P()MP and / =minP∈P() /P . Let $i :E → Ei, where i∈U, and $Q : E → Fq,
where Q∈P(B), be surjective linear mappings de#ning a B-LKPS with informa-
tion rate ′. Then, there exists a -LBES with information rate =/′ and broadcast
information rate B = /=M .
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Proof. We consider, for every P ∈P(), a set of publicly known vectors {v1; : : : vMP} ⊂
F/q such that any subset with cardinality / is a basis of F
/
q . For instance, we can con-
sider vj = (1; xj; x2j ; : : : ; x
/−1
j ), where x1; : : : ; xMP are distinct elements of the :eld Fq.
Let us take the vector spaces EP = E × F/q , VP = FMPq , where P ∈P(), and V0 = F/q .
For every P ∈P(), we consider the linear mappings *P :EP → V0, (P :EP → E and
)P :EP → VP , which are de:ned, respectively, by *P(x; v) = v; (P(x; v) = x and
)P(x; v) = (v · v1 + $Q1 (x); : : : ; v · vMP + $QMP (x)):
Observe that )P is surjective because, by Lemma 10, the linear mapping -p(x) =
($Q1 (x); : : : ; $QMP (x)) is surjective. We are going to prove that these linear mappings
ful:ll the conditions in Theorem 5 and, then, de:ne a -LBES. That is, we have to
prove that:
(1) ker(P + ker*P = EP ,
(2) ker($i ◦ (P) ∩ ker)P ⊂ ker*P for any i∈P,
(3) if F ∈FP , then
(⋂
j∈F ker ($j ◦ (P) ∩ ker)P
)
+ ker*P = EP .
First condition is obviously satis:ed.
Let i∈P be a user in a privileged subset P ∈P(). Let us consider (x; v)∈ ker ($i ◦
(P) ∩ ker)P . Then, since ker $i ⊂ ker $Q for any Q∈P(B) such that i∈Q, there
exist at least / distinct subsets Qh1 ; : : : ; Qh/ ∈BP such that $Qhj (x)=0. Then, v · vhj =0
for any j = 1; : : : ; / because )P(x; v) = 0. Since vh1 ; : : : ; vh/ are linearly independent
vectors in F/q , we have that *P(x; v) = v= 0.
Let us consider now a forbidden subset F ∈FP . Since, by Lemma 10, -P is surjec-
tive, for any v∈V0, there exists a vector xv ∈E such that -P(xv)=−(v · v1; : : : ; v · vMP).
By Lemma 10, ker-P +
⋂
j∈F ker $j = E. Then xv = yv + zv, where yv ∈ ker-P and
zv ∈
⋂
j∈F ker $j. Observe that
)P(zv; v) = (v · v1; : : : ; v · vMP) +-P(zv) = (v · v1; : : : ; v · vMP) +-P(xv) = 0:
Therefore, for any (x; v)∈EP , we have that (x; v)=(zv; v)+(x−zv; 0), where (zv; v)∈
⋂
j∈F
ker ($j ◦ (P) ∩ ker)P and (x − zv; 0)∈ ker*P .
Since the linear mappings above satisfy the three conditions in Theorem 5, we have
obtained a -LBES with information rate
=
dim V0
maxi∈U dimEi
=
/
maxi∈U dim Ei
= /′
and broadcast information rate
B =
dim V0
maxP∈P() dim VP
=
/
maxP∈P()MP
=
/
M
:
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We obtain in this way several LBES for the access structure , namely, one for each
choice of the family B and a B-LKPS. At this point, the problem of :nding -LBES
with a good trade-o; between the information rate  and the broadcast information
rate B can be reduced to make a good choice of the families B.
For instance, if the speci:cation structure  is such that |P|= r for any P ∈P(),
we can consider, for any ‘ = 1; : : : ; r the family B‘ = {B‘P: P ∈P()} such that
B‘P = {Q ⊂ P: |Q| = ‘} for any P ∈P(). Observe that, in this case, MP = ( r‘ ) and
/P = (
r−1
‘−1 ) for any P ∈P(). Therefore, for any ‘ = 1; : : : ; r, there exists a -LBES
with information rate
‘ =
(
r − 1
‘ − 1
)
′‘;
where ′‘ is the information rate of a B‘ -LKPS, and broadcast information rate B‘=
/=M = ‘=r.
Example 12. In particular, we can consider the threshold speci:cation structure  =
(r;6 t). Then B‘=(‘;6 t+r−‘) for any ‘=1; : : : ; r. In this case, since there exists a
B‘ -LKPS with information rate ′‘=(
t+r−1
‘−1 )
−1 [6,22], we obtain, for any ‘=1; : : : ; r,
a (r;6 t)-LBES with information rate
‘ =
(
r − 1
‘ − 1
)/(
t + r − 1
‘ − 1
)
and broadcast information rate B‘ = ‘=r. These (r;6 t)-LBESs are equivalent to the
BESs proposed in [9].
Our construction can also be applied to other speci:cation structures di;erent from
the threshold ones, as can be seen in the following example.
Example 13. Let us suppose that the set of users is divided into two parts, U=U1∪U2.
Let r, t1 and t2 be positive integers and let r; t1 ; t2 be the speci:cation structure on U
de:ned by: (P; F)∈r; t1 ; t2 if and only if |P|=r and |F∩Ui|6 ti if P∩Ui = ∅. Observe
that, if, for instance, P ⊂ U1, then U2 ∪ F ∈FP for any F ⊂ U1 with |F |6 t1. That
is, any coalition of users in U2 cannot obtain any information about the secret key
associated to a privileged subset P ⊂ U1 and vice versa. Observe that privileged groups
with users in both U1 and U2 are also considered.
A r; t1 ; t2 -LKPS with information rate
=
(
t + r
r − 1
)−1
;
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where t= t1 + t2, is constructed in [22]. It is easy to check that 
r; t1 ; t2
B‘
=‘; t1+r−‘; t2+r−‘
for any ‘=1; 2; : : : ; r. Therefore, for any ‘=1; 2; : : : ; r, there exists a r; t1 ; t2 -LBES with
information rate
‘ =
(
r − 1
‘ − 1
)/(
t + 2r − ‘
‘ − 1
)
and broadcast information rate B‘ = ‘=r.
6. Conclusions and open problems
Following some ideas in [22], in the present work we have provided a new general
approach to the construction of broadcast encryption schemes based on linear algebraic
techniques. We introduce a class of BESs, called linear broadcast encryption schemes
(LBESs), containing, as far as we know, all previous proposals of BESs.
Given a speci:cation structure , we present some techniques to construct -LBESs
from several linear key predistribution schemes whose speci:cation structures B are
constructed from a family of coverings of the privileged subsets of . The good
trade-o; between the information rates,  and B, depends on the choice of the spec-
i:cation structures B and the B-LKPSs that are used. We present as well a family
of -LBESs, where  is not a threshold speci:cation structure.
Observe that the construction we have presented in Section 5 works only for spec-
i:cation structures in which all privileged subsets have the same number of users.
The construction of LBESs for other speci:cation structures, for instance, for threshold
speci:cation structures in the form  = (6 r;6 t), is still an open problem.
It is shown in [9] how to design a family of BESs with speci:cation structure
 = (r;6 t), and information rates
=
(
r − 1
‘ − 1
)/(
t + r − 1
‘ − 1
)
and B = ‘=r, for every ‘∈{1; : : : ; r}. In this way, a trade-o; between  and B is
obtained. Nevertheless, it has not been possible until now to prove or disprove the
optimality of these BESs. Another open problem appears at this point: to :nd bounds
on the information rate  in terms of the broadcast information rate B, or vice versa.
We feel that the optimality of the BESs in [9] could be derived from such bounds.
On the other side, it would be also interesting to design (r;6 t)-LBESs whose values
of  and B are not achieved in the construction in [9] and, if possible, to prove their
optimality.
Finally, the model we present in this paper could be applied to study the design
of unconditionally secure multiple use broadcast encryption schemes (MBESs) [16],
that is, schemes in which several broadcasts can be made without loss of security. The
MBESs proposed in [5,16] are based on computational assumptions.
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